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Abstract 
A two-country model of the FDI versus export decisions of firms is analysed. The 
analysis considers both the Cournot duopoly and the Bertrand duopoly models with 
differentiated products. It is shown that the static game is often a prisoners’ dilemma 
where both firms are worse off when they both undertake FDI. To avoid the 
prisoners’ dilemma, in an infinitely-repeated game, the firms can collude over their 
FDI versus export decisions. Then, a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch 
from exporting to undertaking FDI when trade costs are relatively high. Also, 
collusion over FDI may increase welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been a rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) and most 
of this FDI has been horizontal FDI where both the source and the host are developed countries.1 
There is even intra-industry FDI between developed countries where firms in the same industry are 
undertaking FDI in their competitors’ home markets. An intriguing question is why has FDI grown 
rapidly in an era when trade costs have been reduced by trade liberalisation. Intuition suggests that a 
reduction in trade costs (transport costs and/or import tariffs) will increase the profitability of 
exporting relative to the profitability of undertaking FDI. In the theoretical literature on FDI, it is 
generally the case that a reduction in trade costs would only cause firms to switch from undertaking 
FDI to exporting. Although Brainard (1997) provides empirical evidence to support the proximity-
concentration hypothesis, this still leaves unanswered the question of why there has been a rapid 
growth of FDI in an era of trade liberalisation. To answer this question, this paper will present a 
model where a reduction in trade costs may actually lead firms to switch from exporting to 
undertaking FDI. This will occur when trade costs are relatively high whereas conventional wisdom 
prevails when trade costs are relatively low, and hence the relationship between trade costs and FDI 
need not be monotonic. 
The model presented in this paper builds upon the existing theoretical literature that started 
with Hortsmann and Markusen (1987) and Smith (1987) where FDI is viewed as a strategic 
investment in models of intra-industry trade under Cournot duopoly based upon Brander (1981) and 
Brander and Krugman (1983). Two firms each located in a separate country may either export to their 
competitor’s market or undertake FDI. In a static game, the choice depends upon the trade costs 
incurred by exporting and the fixed cost of undertaking FDI with firms more likely to undertake FDI 
when the trade costs are high and/or the fixed cost of undertaking FDI is low. When a firm undertakes 
FDI, the result is to intensify competition in its competitor’s market and thereby reduce the profits of 
the competitor in its home market. Therefore, when both firms undertake FDI, the outcome of the 
game is often a prisoners’ dilemma where both firms make lower profits when they both undertake 
                                                 
1 For reviews of the stylized facts about FDI see chapter one of Markusen (1982) and chapter one of 
Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
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FDI than when they both export. The innovation in this paper is to consider an infinitely-repeated 
version of this static game where firms can avoid the prisoners’ dilemma by tacitly colluding over 
their choice of undertaking FDI or exporting. Realising their strategic interdependence, the firms 
implicitly agree that both will export rather than undertaking FDI and this can be sustained by the 
threat that if one firm undertakes FDI then the other will retaliate by also undertaking FDI. First, it is 
shown that collusion over FDI can be sustained by Nash-reversion trigger strategies as in Friedman 
(1971) for a given discount factor if the fixed cost of undertaking FDI is sufficiently high. Secondly, it 
is shown that a reduction in trade costs may reduce the incentive to collude and thereby may lead the 
firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI if the trade cost is sufficiently high. Thirdly, it is 
shown that it is possible that collusion over FDI may increase the welfare of the countries when the 
trade cost is an import tariff and even when the trade cost is a transport cost. Finally, the robustness of 
the analysis is checked by considering the case of Bertrand competition using an extension of the 
model of intra-industry trade under Bertrand duopoly of Clarke and Collie (2003). 
The extensive theoretical literature on FDI as a strategic investment under oligopoly started 
with Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Smith (1987).2 Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and 
Rowthorn (1992) consider symmetric two-country models where the market structure is endogenous 
with the firms choosing whether or not to have a factory in each country. In these models, the 
existence of multinational firms can arise endogenously, but a feature of these models is the 
possibility of multiple equilibria. The model presented in this paper has a similar symmetric structure, 
but the firms are assumed to have already established factories in their home markets, and their choice 
is purely between exporting to the foreign market or undertaking FDI in the foreign market. This 
simplifying assumption avoids the complications that arise from multiple equilibria, and allows the 
infinitely-repeated game to be analysed in a tractable manner. In Motta (1992), a potential 
multinational firm has already established a factory in its home market and it competes with a 
potential local entrant in the foreign country. Then, a foreign tariff may lead the multinational to 
choose not to invest in the foreign market as the tariff may induce entry by the local firm, and 
                                                 
2 For a broader survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature on multinational firms and FDI, 
see Caves (2007). 
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therefore a tariff may have an unconventional effect. Motta and Norman (1996), Norman and Motta 
(1993) and Neary (2002) have shown that economic integration (a reduction in trade costs within a 
trade bloc) may increase FDI. It should be noted that in this paper there is a reduction in all trade costs 
that is equivalent to multilateral trade liberalisation rather than preferential trade liberalisation. 
Recently, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) have provided an explanation for the co-existence of 
reciprocal intra-industry trade and reciprocal intra-industry FDI. The literature on FDI under 
oligopoly has generally used static game theory models, but an exception is Leahy and Pavelin (2003) 
who use an infinitely-repeated game, where firms can tacitly collude over outputs, to explain the 
follow-my-leader FDI observed by Knickerbocker (1973). This paper does not consider collusion over 
outputs (or prices) but only collusion over the choice of undertaking FDI or exporting.3 
Section two presents the static game theory model of FDI under Counot duopoly, and the 
infinitely-repeated game is presented in section three. The static game theory model of FDI under 
Bertrand duopoly is presented in section four and section five presents the infinitely-repeated game. 
Finally, the conclusions are in section six. 
2. The Cournot Duopoly Model 
In this symmetric model, there are two countries, labelled A and B, and there are two firms, 
labelled one and two, that produce differentiated products. Firm one has incurred a sunk cost to design 
its product and to build a factory in country A. Symmetrically, firm two has incurred a sunk cost to 
design its product and to build a factory in country B. It is assumed that firm one is owned by 
shareholders who are resident in country A, and firm two is owned by shareholders who are resident 
in country B. The firms play a two-stage game that is infinitely repeated and the discount factor for 
both firms is [ ]0,1δ ∈ . At stage one, they each independently choose whether to export to the other 
country, which incurs a trade cost (a transport cost and/or an import tariff) of k  per unit exported, or 
to undertake FDI by building a factory in the other country, which incurs an amortized fixed cost of 
G  per period. Then, at the second stage, the firms compete as Cournot duopolists in the two markets, 
                                                 
3 There is also a related literature that considers how trade costs affect the sustainability of multimarket 
collusion over outputs and prices; see, Bond and Syropoulos (2008) who analyse collusion as in Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990) in the Brander and Krugman (1983) model of intra-industry trade. 
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which are assumed to be segmented. Both firms have a marginal cost of c  whether they produce in 
the factory in their home country or, if they undertake FDI, in the factory in the foreign country. In 
each country, there is a representative consumer with preferences that can be represented by identical, 
quadratic, quasi-linear utility functions that yield linear demand functions for the differentiated 
products of the two firms. For country A, the utility function is: 
 ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 2 1 222A A A A A A A AU x x x x x x zβα φ= + − + + +  (1) 
where 1Ax  is the consumption of the product of firm one, 2 Ax  is the consumption of the product of 
firm two, and Az  is the consumption of the numeraire good in country A. The numeraire good is 
produced by a perfectly competitive industry with constant returns to scale technology. The parameter 
α  is the maximum willingness to pay of the consumers, β  is inversely related to the size of the 
market, and φ  is the degree of product substitutability that ranges from 0φ =  when the products are 
independent to 1φ =  when the products are perfect substitutes. Utility maximisation by the 
representative consumer yields the inverse demand functions in country A: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2A A A A A Ap x x p x xα β φ α β φ= − + = − +  (2) 
The utility function and demand functions are defined symmetrically for country B, and 
denoted by subscript B rather than A. Consider the market in country A, when firm two chooses to 
export, the marginal cost of firm one will be c  and the marginal cost of firm two will be c k+ . 
Therefore, the operating profits (before the fixed cost) of the firms will be ( )1 1 1A A Ap c xπ = −  and 
( )2 2 2A A Ap c k xπ = − − . The usual derivations for a Cournot duopoly yield the outputs, prices and 
profits of the two firms, where the superscript E denotes that firm two is exporting to country A: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 2
2 2
1 22 2
2 2 2
, ,
2 2 2
, ,
1 12 , 2 2 ,
E E
A A
E E
A A
E E
A A
c k c k
x x
c k c k
p c p c k
c k c k
φ α φ φ α
β β
φ α φ φ α
π φ α φ π φ αβ β
− − + − − −= =Ω Ω
− − + − − += + = + +Ω Ω
= ⎡ − − + ⎤ = ⎡ − − − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦Ω Ω
 (3) 
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where 24 0φΩ = − > . The exports of firm two to country A and the profits of firm two from exports 
will be zero if the trade cost is prohibitive, ( )( )2 2k k cφ α≥ ≡ − − . If the trade cost is prohibitive 
then the firm one produces the monopoly output and earns monopoly profits in country A, which is 
the same as the outcome under autarky. Symmetry of the model implies that: 1 2
E E
B Ax x= , 2 1E EB Ax x= , 
1 2
E E
B Ap p= , 2 1E EB Ap p= , 1 2E EB Aπ π=  and 2 1E EB Aπ π= , where, for country B variables, the superscript E 
denotes that firm one is exporting to country B. 
When firm two chooses to undertake FDI, the marginal cost of both firms will be c . 
Therefore, the operating profits (before the fixed cost) of the firms will be ( )1 1 1A A Ap c xπ = −  and 
( )2 2 2A A Ap c xπ = − . The usual derivations for a Cournot duopoly yield the outputs, prices and profits 
of the two firms, where the superscript F denotes that firm two is undertaking FDI to supply 
country A: 
 ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2 2
1
2 2 2
F F F F F F
A A A A A A
c c c
x x p p
α α φ απ πβ φ φ β φ
− + + −= = = = = =+ + +  (4) 
Comparing prices in (3) and (4) shows that FDI intensifies competition since the prices set by 
both firms are lower when firm two undertakes FDI to supply country A than when it exports to 
country A, which reduces the profits of firm one. Symmetry of the model implies that: 1 2 1
F F F
B B Ax x x= = , 
1 2 1
F F F
B B Ap p p= = , and 1 2 1F F FB B Aπ π π= = , where, for country B variables, the superscript F denotes that 
firm one is undertaking FDI in country B. 
Since each firm can choose either to export or to undertake FDI, there are four possible cases 
to consider. The model is symmetric so the profits of the firms will also be symmetric. Denote the 
operating profits (before the fixed cost) of a firm from sales in the two countries as: EEΠ  when both 
firms choose to export; FEΠ  when the firm chooses to export and its competitor chooses to undertake 
FDI; EFΠ  when the firm chooses to export and its competitor chooses to undertake FDI; and FFΠ  
when both firms choose to undertake FDI. Hence, using (3) and (4), the operating profits of the firms 
from sales in the two countries are: 
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1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, ,
, .
E E E E E F F E
EE A B A B FE A B A B
F E E F F F F F
EF A B A B FF A B A B
π π π π π π π π
π π π π π π π π
Π = + = + Π = + = +
Π = + = + Π = + = +
 (5) 
In the static game, when its competitor chooses to export, undertaking FDI is profitable for a 
firm if FE EEGΠ − > Π  and, when its competitor chooses to undertake FDI, undertaking FDI is 
profitable if FF EFGΠ − >Π . As markets are segmented, the decision of the firm is actually 
independent of the choice of its competitor, and undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both firms 
if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value FE EE FF EFG ≡ Π −Π = Π −Π : 
 ( )( )24 2kG c kφ αβ= ⎡ − − − ⎤⎣ ⎦Ω  (6) 
Clearly, this is a concave quadratic in the trade cost k  that is increasing in the trade cost up to 
the prohibitive trade cost, k k= . The critical value of the fixed cost of FDI is shown in figure one as a 
function of the trade cost for the parameter values: 50α = , 1β = , 14c = , with 9 10φ =  in figure 1a 
and with 1 2φ =  in figure 1b. Undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both firms in the region 
where G G<  whereas exporting is a dominant strategy for both firms in the region where G G> . 
Hence, in this static game, a reduction in trade costs will only lead firms to shift from undertaking 
FDI to exporting, and will never lead firms to shift from exporting to undertaking FDI. 
When both firms undertake FDI they will have higher profits than when they both export if 
FF EEGΠ − >Π , and this will be the case if the fixed cost of FDI is less than 
( ) ( )ˆ FF EE FE EE FF FEG ≡ Π −Π = Π −Π + Π −Π . The first bracketed term is the profit gain for a firm 
from undertaking FDI whereas the second bracketed term is the effect on a firm’s profits of its 
competitor undertaking FDI. Using the definition of G  from (6), Gˆ  becomes: ( )ˆ FF FEG G= + Π −Π , 
and then using (3), (4) and (5) the term in brackets is: 
 ( )( )2 2 2 0FF FE k c kφ φ α φβΠ −Π = − ⎡ − − + ⎤ <⎣ ⎦Ω  (7) 
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Since FDI intensifies competition, a firm makes lower profits when its competitor undertakes 
FDI than when its competitor exports, FF FEΠ <Π , and it will always be the case that Gˆ G< . 
Differentiating (7) with respect to the degree of product substitutability, φ , yields: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )2 232 2 2 2 4 0FF FE k c kφ φ φ α φ φφ β∂ Π −Π − ⎡ ⎤= − − + − + + <⎣ ⎦∂ Ω  (8) 
Therefore, the reduction in profits as a result of a firm’s competitor undertaking FDI is 
increasing in the degree of product substitutability, and hence ( )ˆG G−  is increasing in the degree of 
product substitutability. Substituting (6) and (7) into the definition of Gˆ  yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 22ˆ 2 2 4kG c kφ α φβ ⎡ ⎤= − − − +⎣ ⎦Ω  (9) 
This is a concave quadratic that has a maximum value when the trade cost is 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2ˆ 2 4k cφ α φ≡ − − + , where kˆ k<  for 0φ > , and it is positive if ˆ2k k< , where ˆ2k k<  if the 
degree of product substitutability ( )2 2 1 0 83φ > − ≈ ⋅ . Obviously, the quadratic (9) is increasing in 
k  for ˆk k<  and decreasing for ˆk k< . The explanation for this is that profits when both countries 
choose to export, EEΠ , is decreasing in the trade cost when ˆk k<  and increasing when ˆk k> . An 
increase in the trade cost has a negative effect on exports since it increases the marginal cost of the 
firm whereas it has a positive effect on domestic sales since it increases the marginal cost of the firm’s 
competitor, but the absolute size of the direct effect on exports is larger than the indirect effect on 
domestic sales. Therefore, when the trade cost is low and the price-cost margins are similar in the two 
markets then the negative effect on exports will dominate the positive effect on domestic sales, 
whereas when the trade cost is high and the price-cost margin on domestic sales is much higher than 
on exports then the positive effect on domestic sales will dominate the negative effect on exports. 
Profits will be higher when both firms undertake FDI than when both export in the region in 
figure one where ˆG G< . In the region where Gˆ G G< < , the static game is a prisoners’ dilemma 
where undertaking FDI is the dominant strategy for both firms, but profits are lower when both firms 
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undertake FDI than when they both export as a result of more intensive competition and the firms 
incurring the fixed cost of undertaking FDI. Comparing figure 1a when the products are close 
substitutes and figure 1b, it can be seen that the outcome is more likely to be a prisoners’ dilemma 
when the products are close substitutes, as expected given (8), since this is when competition will be 
most intense. 
3. The Infinitely-Repeated Cournot Duopoly Game 
As is well known, firms can avoid the prisoners’ dilemma problem by tacitly colluding when 
the game is infinitely repeated. Friedman (1971) showed that Nash reversion trigger strategies can 
sustain a collusive outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game. 
The preferred outcome where both firms choose to export could be sustained by the threat of 
reversion to the Nash equilibrium where both firms undertake FDI if the discount factor is sufficiently 
high. It is assumed that the firms only collude over the undertaking FDI versus exporting decision, 
and that the firms choose outputs as Cournot duopolists in the second stage of the game. The 
equilibrium of this infinitely-repeated game will be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as the firms 
are using Nash equilibrium strategies in all subgames. Both firms choosing to export is a Nash 
equilibrium if the present discounted profits from collusion (both firms choosing to export) exceed the 
present discounted value of profits from cheating (choosing to undertake FDI when the competitor has 
chosen to export) for one period followed forever thereafter by the Nash equilibrium profits (when 
both firms choose to undertake FDI): 
 ( ) ( )1
1 1EE FE FF
G Gδδ δΠ > Π − + Π −− −  (10) 
The collusive outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if the fixed cost of FDI is 
greater than the critical value obtained by rearranging (10), which yields: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* ˆ1 1FE EE FF EEG G Gδ δ δ δ δ= − Π −Π + Π −Π = − +  (11) 
The critical value *G  is a convex combination of G  and Gˆ  where the weights depend upon 
the discount factor. When the discount factor is equal to zero, the critical fixed cost is *G G=  and 
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when the discount factor is one, the critical value of the fixed cost is * ˆG G= . Thus, as one would 
expect, this means that when 1δ =  the collusive equilibrium can be sustained whenever the static 
game is a prisoners’ dilemma, ˆG G> . Since Gˆ G< , the critical value of the fixed cost in the 
infinitely repeated game is lower than in the static game if the discount factor is greater than zero, 
0δ > , and it is decreasing in the discount factor. Substituting (5) into (11), yields the critical fixed 
cost of FDI in terms of the parameters of the model: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )* 22 2 2 2 4kG c kδ φ φδ α φ δβ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − +⎣ ⎦Ω  (12) 
It is shown in figure two as a concave quadratic function of the trade cost for a number of 
discount factors { }0,1 3,2 3,1δ ∈  using the same parameter values as in figure one with 9 10φ =  in 
figure 2a and 1 2φ =  in figure 2b. In the region between ( )*G δ  and G , the collusive outcome where 
both firms export can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely-repeated game whereas both 
firms would undertake FDI in the static game. Clearly, a larger discount factor makes it easier to 
sustain the collusive outcome where firms choose exporting rather than undertaking FDI. This leads to 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Under Cournot duopoly, the collusive outcome where both firms export can be 
sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely-repeated game if the fixed cost of 
FDI is greater than the critical value *G , and the critical value is decreasing in the discount factor, 
* 0G δ∂ ∂ < . 
Before considering the welfare effects of collusion, it is worthwhile to analyse how trade 
costs affect the sustainability of collusion as this has an interesting implication for the relationship 
between trade costs and FDI. To understand how the critical value of fixed cost of FDI depends upon 
the trade cost, differentiate (12) with respect to k , which yields: 
 ( )( )( ) ( )* 222 2 2 4G c kk φ φδ α φ δβ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − +⎣ ⎦∂ Ω  (13) 
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For low trade costs the derivative will be positive, but for a sufficiently high trade costs the 
derivative is negative. The derivative is negative if the trade cost is greater than: 
 ( )( ) ( )* 22 24k c
φ φδ αφ δ
− −= −+  (14) 
This critical value of the trade cost is equal to the prohibitive trade cost, *k k= , when the 
discount factor is 0δ = , and it decreases to * ˆk k=  when 1δ = , where kˆ k<  for [ ]0,1φ ∈ . In figures 
2a and 2b, the critical fixed cost *G  is decreasing to the right of the curve labelled * *k k  that joins the 
maxima of *G  and that represents *k  as an implicit function of the discount factor. Hence, in the 
shaded regions in figures 2a and 2b, if there is a regime switch as a result of a reduction in trade costs 
then firms will shift from exporting to undertaking FDI. For example, in figure 2a when the discount 
factor is 2 3δ = , a reduction in trade costs may shift the equilibrium from E (where both firms 
export) to F (where both firms undertake FDI). Comparing figures 2a and 2b, it seems that this will 
happen for a wider range of values of the transport cost when the products are close substitutes. This 
leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Under Cournot duopoly, if the trade cost *k k>  then the critical value of the fixed cost 
*G  is decreasing in the trade cost, * 0G k∂ ∂ < , and a reduction in trade costs may lead the firms to 
switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. 
When the trade cost is sufficiently high, a reduction in trade costs makes it harder for the 
firms to sustain the collusive outcome where both firms export, and may lead to a switch to the 
outcome where both firms undertake FDI. This is because when the trade cost is sufficiently high a 
reduction in trade costs will reduce the profitability of collusion where both firms export, EEΠ ; 
increase the profitability of cheating (undertaking FDI while the competitor exports), FEΠ ; and not 
affect the profitability in the Nash equilibrium, FFΠ . This result, which never occurs in the static 
game, might provide an explanation for the increase in FDI in an era when multilateral trade 
liberalisation has reduced trade costs. 
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When firms collude over prices or outputs, the effect is unambiguously to reduce welfare by 
increasing the deadweight loss from oligopoly, but the welfare effects of collusion over FDI turn out 
to be more ambiguous. The welfare effects will differ depending upon whether the trade cost is a 
transport cost involving a real resource cost or an import tariff where the tariff revenue accrues to the 
governments. First, consider the case when the trade cost is a transport cost then the welfare of a 
country is given by the sum of consumer surplus and the profits of its firm. When collusion occurs, 
( )*G G δ> , the firms will both export rather than both undertake FDI, and the welfare of a country 
when both firms export is: 
 ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 222R E E E EEE A A A A EEW x x x xβ φ⎡ ⎤= + + +Π⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (15) 
The first expression is consumer surplus given the quasi-linear utility function (1) for 
country A, but symmetry implies that consumer surplus is the same in both countries, and the 
superscript R denotes a real trade (transport) cost. In the static game, if G G< , then both firms 
undertake FDI, and the welfare of a country when both firms undertake FDI is: 
 ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 222R F F F FFF A A A A FFW x x x x Gβ φ⎡ ⎤= + + +Π −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (16) 
Subtracting (16) from(15) then using (3), (4) and (5) yields the welfare effect of collusion 
over FDI, the difference in welfare between the collusive equilibrium where both firms export and the 
static equilibrium where both firms undertake FDI: R R REE FFW W W∆ = − : 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 3 2 122R kW G c kφ φ α φβ ⎡ ⎤∆ = − + − − − −⎣ ⎦Ω  (17) 
The collusive outcome where the firms export rather than undertake FDI reduces the intensity 
of competition and leads to higher prices, but the firms do not incur the fixed cost of FDI. Hence, the 
welfare effect of collusion over FDI will be positive (negative) if the fixed cost of FDI is more (less) 
than: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 3 2 122R kG c kφ φ α φβ ⎡ ⎤= + − − − −⎣ ⎦Ω  (18) 
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This is a concave quadratic in the trade cost, k , that is shown in figure three for the same 
parameter values as in figures one and two with 9 10φ =  in figure 3a and with 1 2φ =  in figure 3b. 
Since collusion over FDI can only occur when the fixed cost of FDI ( )* 0G G G δ< = = , it is 
informative to compare RG  with G , which can be done by subtracting (6) from (18) to obtain: 
 ( )( )2 1
2
R kG G c kφ αβ− = ⎡ − − − ⎤⎣ ⎦Ω  (19) 
This is a concave quadratic in the trade cost, k , that is equal to zero when the trade cost is 
zero and positive (negative) if the trade cost ( ) ( )( )2 1Rk k cφ α< > ≡ − − , where ( )Rk k< >  if 
( )2 3φ > < . Hence, if the products are not close substitutes, 2 3φ <  as in figure 3b, then RG G>  for 
all trade costs, 0,k k⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ , and if the firms collude over FDI then there will be welfare losses for both 
countries. However, if the products are close substitutes, 2 3φ >  as in figure 3a, then there is the 
possibility of a welfare gain from collusion over FDI if the fixed cost of FDI RG G> , but this will 
only be the case if the trade cost Rk k> . A welfare gain from collusion over FDI occurs in region R in 
figure 3a, which includes the case when the trade cost is prohibitive. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: Under Cournot duopoly, with real trade (transport) costs, there will be a welfare gain 
from collusion over FDI if RG G> , which will only be the case if 2 3φ >  and Rk k> . Otherwise 
there will be a welfare loss. 
The counterintuitive possibility of a welfare gain from collusion over FDI arises because the 
loss of consumer surplus is outweighed by the increase in profits and not having to incur the fixed 
cost of FDI when both firms export rather than undertake FDI. This happens when the products are 
close substitutes and the trade cost is sufficiently high. Then, the strategic incentive to invest in FDI is 
large and the negative effect on the profits of the firm’s competitor is large. The collusive outcome 
where both firms export not only avoids the prisoners’ dilemma from FDI for the firms but also for 
the countries. 
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When the trade cost is an import tariff rather than a transport cost, the tariff revenue will 
accrue to the government in the importing country and will contribute to the welfare of the country. 
Hence, the welfare of a country when both firms export is given by consumer surplus, the profits of its 
firm, and tariff revenue: 2
T R E
EE EE AW W kx= + , where the superscript T denotes a tariff. Since there is no 
tariff revenue when both firms undertake FDI, the welfare of a country when both firms undertake 
FDI is: R TFF FFW W= . Therefore, the welfare effect of collusion over FDI with a tariff is 
T T T
EE FFW W W∆ = − : 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 2 4 32T kW G c kφ α φβ ⎡ ⎤∆ = − − − + −⎣ ⎦Ω  (20) 
Hence, the welfare effect of collusion over FDI will be positive (negative) if the fixed cost of 
FDI is more (less) than: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 2 4 32T kG c kφ α φβ ⎡ ⎤≡ − − + −⎣ ⎦Ω  (21) 
This is a convex quadratic in the trade cost, k , that is shown in figure three with 9 10φ =  in 
figure 3a and with 1 2φ =  in figure 3b. Note that T RG G=  at the prohibitive trade cost, k k= , as 
tariff revenue is zero since there are no imports. Since collusion over FDI can only occur when the 
fixed cost of FDI ( )* 0G G G δ< = = , it is informative to compare TG  with G , which can be done by 
subtracting (6) from (21) to obtain: 
 ( )2 3
2
T kG G c kαβ
−− = ⎡ − − ⎤⎣ ⎦Ω  (22) 
This is a convex quadratic in the trade cost, k , that is zero when the trade cost is zero and 
will be negative (positive) if the trade cost ( ) ( )2 3Tk k cα< > ≡ − , where Tk k<  if 2 3φ < . If the 
products are close substitutes, 2 3φ >  as in figure 3a, then TG G<  for all trade costs, 0,k k⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ , and 
there will be a welfare gain (loss) from collusion over FDI if ( ) TG G> < . When the products are not 
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close substitutes, 2 3φ <  as in figure 3b, then TG G<  for trade costs Tk k< , and there will be a 
welfare gain (loss) if ( ) TG G> <  whereas if Tk k>  then there is a welfare loss. 
Also, since collusion over FDI can only occur when the fixed cost of FDI ( )*ˆ 1G G G δ> = = , 
it is informative to compare TG  with Gˆ , which can be done by subtracting (9) from (21) to obtain: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 22ˆ 2 2 122T kG G c kφ α φβ− ⎡ ⎤− = − − − −⎣ ⎦Ω  (23) 
Therefore, ( ) ˆTG G> <  if the trade cost ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 2 12Sk k cφ α φ> < ≡ − − − , where 
Sk k<  whatever the degree of product substitutability, [ ]0,1φ ∈  as shown in figures 3a and 3b. 
Hence, with import tariffs, there will always be a welfare gain from collusion if Sk k< . This leads to 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: Under Cournot duopoly, with import tariffs, there will be a welfare gain from 
collusion over FDI if TG G> , which will always be the case for 0, Sk k⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ , may be the case for 
,Sk k k⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦  if 2 3φ >  or ,S Tk k k⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦  if 2 3φ < . Otherwise there will be a welfare loss. 
A welfare gain from collusion over FDI occurs in regions R and T in figure 3a, and in 
region T in figure 3b. The likelihood of a welfare gain from collusion over FDI is greater with import 
tariffs than with transport costs as transport costs are a real resource cost to the countries. As an 
illustration of the different welfare effects with transport costs and tariffs, figure four compares 
welfare in the static game with welfare in the infinitely-repeated game for the same parameters as in 
previous figures with 9 10φ = , 2 3δ = , and 60G = . The critical fixed cost of FDI to sustain 
collusion ( )* 2 3G δ =  and the fixed cost 60G =  are shown in figure 3a. The corresponding welfare 
in the static and the infinitely-repeated games is shown in figure 4a when the trade cost is a transport 
cost and in figure 4b when the trade cost is a tariff. In region I, both firms export in the static game 
and in the infinitely-repeated game so there is no collusive outcome and hence no welfare effect from 
collusion. In region II, both firms undertake FDI in the static game while there is a collusive outcome 
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in the infinitely-repeated game where both firms export. This results in a welfare loss with transport 
costs in figure 4a and a welfare gain with tariffs in figure 4b. In region III, both firms undertake FDI 
in the static game and in the infinitely-repeated game so there is no collusive outcome and hence no 
welfare loss from collusion. In region IV, both firms undertake FDI in the static game while there is a 
collusive outcome in the infinitely-repeated game where both firms export. This results in a welfare 
loss with both transport costs in figure 4a and with tariffs in figure 4b. Figures 4a and 4b also show 
how a reduction in trade costs may lead to a switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. 
4. The Bertrand Duopoly Model 
Models of international trade under imperfect competition are notorious for yielding different 
results under Bertrand oligopoly than under Cournot oligopoly. Since outputs are strategic substitutes 
in the Cournot duopoly, firms will ‘overinvest’ in FDI under Cournot duopoly whereas since prices 
are strategic complements in the Bertrand duopoly model firms will ‘underinvest’ in FDI under 
Bertrand duopoly.4 Therefore, one might expect significantly different results from the two models so 
this section will consider the case of Bertrand duopoly when the firms compete in prices rather than 
Cournot duopoly when the firms compete in outputs. A thorough analysis of international trade in the 
Bertrand duopoly model in the presence of trade costs is provided by Clarke and Collie (2003), which 
should be consulted for details of the best-reply functions and the derivations of the boundary 
solutions. Given the utility function (1), the demand functions facing the two firms in country A are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 22
2 1 22
1 1
1
1 1
1
A A A
A A A
x p p
x p p
α φ φβ φ
α φ φβ φ
= ⎡ − − + ⎤⎣ ⎦−
= ⎡ − + − ⎤⎣ ⎦−
 (24) 
Consider the market in country A when firm two chooses to export, assuming that there is an 
interior solution where both firms have positive sales. Then, the usual derivations yield the Bertrand 
duopoly prices, sales and operating profits of the two firms: 
                                                 
4 For an explanation of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, see Bulow et al (1985). In the 
terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), a firm would want to be a top dog under Cournot duopoly and a 
puppy dog under Bertrand duopoly. 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2
1 2
2 2 2
1 22 2
2 22 2 2
1 22 2 2 2
2 2 2
,
2 2 2
,
1 1
2 2 2
,
1 1
E E
A A
E E
A A
E E
A A
c k c k
p c p c k
c k c k
x x
c k c k
φ φ α φ φ φ α φ
φ φ α φ φ φ α φ
β φ β φ
φ φ α φ φ φ α φπ πβ φ β φ
− − − + − − − − −= + = + +Ω Ω
− − − + − − − − −= =− Ω − Ω
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − + − − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= =− Ω − Ω
 (25) 
The exports of firm two to country A will be zero and the profits of firm two from exports will 
be zero if the trade cost: ( )( ) ( )2 22 2k k cφ φ α φ> ≡ − − − − . This is decreasing in the degree of 
product substitutability from ( )cα −  when the products are independent, 0φ = , to zero when the 
products are perfect substitutes, 1φ = . However, in the Bertrand duopoly model when k k> , 
competition from firm two will still affect the price set by firm one and the profits earned by firm one. 
Then, as explained in Clarke and Collie (2003), there is a boundary solution equilibrium where firm 
two sets its price equal to marginal cost and its sales are zero. Hence, the Bertrand duopoly prices, 
sales and operating profits of the two firms are: 
 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 2
1 22
1 1 ,
1 , 0
1 , 0
E E
A A
E E
A A
E E
A A
p c k c p c k
x c k x
c k
k c
φ αφ
αφβ
απ φ α πβφ
= + ⎡ − − − ⎤ = +⎣ ⎦
= − − =
− −= ⎡ − − − ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
 (26) 
Firm one will set the monopoly price, ( )1 2EAp cα= + , and earn monopoly profits if the trade 
cost ( )( )2 2k k cφ α≥ ≡ − − , which is the same as the prohibitive trade cost under Cournot duopoly. 
Then, the outcome in country A is the same as under autarky. Again, symmetry of the model implies 
that: 1 2
E E
B Ax x= , 2 1E EB Ax x= , 1 2E EB Ap p= , 2 1E EB Ap p= , 1 2E EB Aπ π=  and 2 1E EB Aπ π= . 
When firm two chooses to undertake FDI, both firms have the same marginal cost so the 
outcome is an interior solution where both firms have positive sales. The usual derivations yield the 
Bertrand duopoly prices, sales and operating profits of the two firms: 
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( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
1 2 1 2
2
1 2 2
1
2 2 1
1
1 2
F F F F
A A A A
F F
A A
c c
p p c x x
c
φ α α
φ β φ φ
φ απ π β φ φ
− − −= = + = =− − +
− −= = + −
 (27) 
As in the Cournot duopoly case, FDI intensifies competition since it leads both firms to set 
lower prices, which reduces the profits of firm one. Again, symmetry of the model implies that: 
1 2 1
F F F
B B Ax x x= = , 1 2 1F F FB B Ap p p= = , and 1 2 1F F FB B Aπ π π= = . 
In the static game, undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both firms if the fixed cost of 
FDI is less than the critical value: FE EE FF EFG = Π −Π =Π −Π . Using (25), (26), (27) and (5), it can 
be shown that: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
2
2
2
2 2 2
2
if 0
1
if 
2
2
1
2 2 2
1
k k
G
k k
k
c
k
k cφ φ φ
φ
α
α
β
β φ φ
φ
φ
⎧⎪ ≤ <⎪⎪≡ ⎨⎪ −
⎡ ⎤− − − − − −⎣
−⎪ ≤+
⎦
≤
−
⎩
Ω
⎪ −
 (28) 
For 0 k k≤ < , this is a concave quadratic that is increasing in the trade cost and, for k k≥ , it 
is independent of the trade cost, since the profits from exporting to the other country are zero so a firm 
will undertake FDI if the operating profits in the other country cover the fixed cost. By comparing (6) 
and (28), it can be shown that G  is larger under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly as a 
result of profits being higher under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly as Vives (1985) has 
shown. The critical fixed cost of FDI, G , is shown in figure five for the same parameters as used in 
previous figures with 9 10φ =  in figure 5a and 1 2φ =  in figure 5b. 
When both firms undertake FDI they will have higher profits than when they both export, 
FF EEGΠ − >Π , and this will be the case if the fixed cost of FDI is less than 
( )ˆ FF EE FF FEG G≡ Π −Π = + Π −Π . As in the Cournot duopoly model, it can be shown that 
( ) 0FF FEΠ −Π <  as in (7) so Gˆ G< , and it can be shown that ( ) 0FF FE φ∂ Π −Π ∂ <  as in (8) so 
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( )ˆG G−  is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. Using (25), (26), (27) and (5) it can be 
shown that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
22 2 4
2 2
2
2 2
2 2 4 3
if 0
1ˆ
12 1
if 
1 2
k c k
k k
G
c k k cc
k k k
φ φ α φ φ
β φ
α φ αφ α
βφβ φ φ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − +⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ≤ <⎪ − Ω⎪≡ ⎨⎪ − − ⎡ − − − ⎤− − ⎣ ⎦⎪ − ≤ ≤⎪ + −⎩
 (29) 
where ( )( )1 0k cφ α− − − >  for k k> . This is a concave quadratic for k k<  that has a maximum 
value at ( ) ( ) ( )22 2 4ˆ 2 4 3k cφ φ α φ φ≡ − − − − + , and is a convex quadratic for k k> . It is shown 
along with G  in figure five with 9 10φ =  in figure 5a and with 1 2φ =  in figure 5b. By comparing 
(9) and (29), it can be shown that Gˆ  is larger under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly. 
Also, it can be shown that ( )ˆ FF FEG G− = − Π −Π  is larger under Bertrand duopoly than under 
Cournot duopoly as the loss of profits when a firm’s competitor chooses to undertake FDI rather than 
to export is larger under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. This implies that the outcome 
is more likely to be a prisoners’ dilemma under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly, and 
this is confirmed by comparing figure five with figure one. Comparison of figures 5a and 5b suggests 
that the outcome is more likely to be a prisoners’ dilemma when the products are close substitutes as 
would be expected given that ( )ˆG G−  is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. 
5. The Infinitely-Repeated Bertrand Duopoly Game 
When the Bertrand duopoly game is infinitely-repeated, the firms can tacitly collude by 
choosing to export rather than undertake FDI so as to avoid the prisoners’ dilemma. Since (10) and 
(11) apply to Bertrand duopoly as well as Cournot duopoly, the collusive outcome can be sustained if 
the fixed cost of FDI is greater than ( ) ( )* ˆ1G G Gδ δ δ= − + . Hence, as Gˆ G< , the critical fixed cost 
of FDI in the infinitely-repeated game is lower than in the static game, *G G< , if the discount factor 
is greater than zero, 0δ > , and it is decreasing in the discount factor. Since G  and Gˆ  are larger 
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under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly, for any given discount factor, ( )*G δ  will be 
larger under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly. Using (25), (26), (27) and (5) in (11), it 
can be shown that critical value of the fixed cost of FDI is: 
 
( )( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2 4
2 2
*
2
2 2
2 2 2 4 4
if 0
1
11 1
if 
1 2
k c k
k k
G
c k k cc
k k k
φ φ δφ φ α φ δφ φ
β φ
δ α φ αδ φ α
βφβ φ φ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − − − + +⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤ <⎪ − Ω⎪= ⎨⎪ − − ⎡ − − − ⎤+ − − ⎣ ⎦⎪ − ≤ ≤⎪ + −⎩
 (30) 
This is concave quadratic for k k<  and a convex quadratic for k k> . It is shown in figure 
six for a range of discount factors using the same parameter values as in previous figures with 
9 10φ =  in figure 6a and with 1 2φ =  in figure 6b. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Under Bertrand duopoly, the collusive outcome where both firms export can be 
sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely-repeated game if the fixed cost of 
FDI is greater than the critical value *G , and the critical value is decreasing in the discount factor, 
* 0G δ∂ ∂ < . 
Again, it is worthwhile to consider how trade costs affect the sustainability of collusion over 
FDI. To understand how the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI depends upon the trade cost, k , 
differentiate (30) with respect to the trade cost, which yields: 
 
( )( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2 2 2 2 4
2 2*
2
2 2 2 4 4
if 0
1
2 2 0 if 
c k
k k
G
k
c k k k k
φ φ δφ φ α φ δφ φ
β φ
δ φ αβφ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − − − + +⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤ ≤⎪ − Ω∂ ⎪= ⎨∂ ⎪⎪− ⎡ − − − ⎤ ≤ < ≤⎣ ⎦⎪⎩
 (31) 
For low trade costs this derivative is positive, but for sufficiently high trade costs this 
derivative is negative. For 0 k k≤ ≤ , it is negative if the trade cost is greater than: 
 
( )( ) ( )2 2* 2 2 42 24 4k c
φ φ δφ φ αφ δφ φ
− − − −= −− + +  (32) 
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This critical value of the trade cost is equal to k  when 0δ =  and it is equal to kˆ  when 1δ = . 
By comparing (14) and (32), it can be shown that *k  is larger under Cournot duopoly than under 
Bertrand duopoly. The derivative (31) is negative for k k k< < , and therefore * 0G k∂ ∂ <  for 
*k k k< < . In figure six, it can be seen that * 0G k∂ ∂ <  in the shaded region to the right of the * *k k  
locus. Then, if there is a regime switch as a result of a reduction in trade costs then firms will shift 
from exporting to undertaking FDI as shown by the move from E to F in figure 5a when the discount 
factor 1 6δ = . Note that this occurs in the region where there is no trade, k k k< < . Although there is 
no trade, the reduction in trade costs decreases the profits from collusion, 1
E
EE AπΠ =  when there is a 
boundary solution as in (26), and thereby makes it harder to sustain the collusive outcome. These 
results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: Under Bertrand duopoly, if the trade cost *k k>  then the critical value of the fixed 
cost *G  is decreasing in the trade cost, * 0G k∂ ∂ < , and a reduction in trade costs may lead the firms 
to undertake FDI rather than export. 
Turning to the welfare effects of collusion over FDI under Bertrand duopoly, consider the 
case when the trade cost is a real resource cost such as a transport cost. The welfare of the country is 
given by (15) when both countries export and by (16) when both countries undertake FDI so the 
welfare effect of collusion is R R REE FFW W W∆ = − . Then, using (25), (26) and (27) it can be shown that 
the welfare effect of collusion will be positive (negative) if the fixed cost of FDI is more (less) than: 
 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 4
2 2
2
2 2
2 1 3 2 2 12 9 2
if 0
2 1
1 23 2
if 
21 2
R
k c k
k k
G
c k c kc
k k k
φ φ φ α φ φ
β φ
α φ αφ α
βφβ φ φ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − − +⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤ ≤⎪ − Ω⎪≡ ⎨⎪ − − ⎡ − − − ⎤− − ⎣ ⎦⎪ + ≤ ≤⎪ + −⎩
 (33) 
This is a concave quadratic in the trade cost for 0 k k≤ ≤ , and a convex quadratic for k k k≤ ≤ . 
It is shown in figure seven for the same parameter values as in previous figures with 9 10φ =  in 
figure 7a and with 1 2φ =  in figure 7b. To see how the region where collusion is possible, 
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Gˆ G G< < , is divided by RG  into regions where there are welfare gains or losses, consider the 
intersections of RG  with G  (note that ˆRG G>  for 0 k k< < ). For 0 k k≤ ≤ , it can be shown that 
RG G<  if ( )( )2 1Rk k cφ α> ≡ − − , where Rk k<  if ( )17 1 4 0 78Rφ φ> ≡ − ≈ ⋅ , and that RG G>  
for 0 k k≤ ≤  if Rφ φ< . Since ( )RG G< >  at k k=  as ( ) Rφ φ> <  and since 0RG k∂ ∂ >  for 
k k k≤ ≤ , if Rφ φ>  then RG G<  for trade costs greater than k  and less than: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )
2 31 2
1
1 2
Uk c
φ φ φφ αφ φ
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥= − + −⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (34) 
where Uk k>  for Rφ φ> . Hence, when the products are close substitutes, Rφ φ>  as in figure 7a, 
there is a range of values for the trade cost, R Uk k k< < , where there are welfare gains from collusion 
if the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently high, RG G>  as in region R in figure 7a. For Rφ φ<  as in 
figure 7b, there is no possibility of welfare gains from collusion over FDI and there are always 
welfare losses. These results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 7: Under Bertrand duopoly, with real trade costs, there will be a welfare gain from 
collusion over FDI if RG G> , which will only be the case if Rφ φ>  and R Uk k k< < . Otherwise there 
will be a welfare loss. 
When the trade cost is an import tariff rather than a transport cost then the tariff revenue will 
accrue to the government in the importing country and will contribute to the welfare of the country 
when the firms export. The addition of tariff revenue means that the collusive outcome where both 
firms export is more likely to be superior in terms of welfare to the Nash equilibrium of the static 
game where both firms undertake FDI. It can be shown that the welfare effect of collusion will be 
positive (negative) if the fixed cost of FDI is more (less) than: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
22
2 2
2
2 2
2 2 4 3
if 0
2 1
1 23 2
if 
21 2
T
k c k
k k
G
c k c kc
k k k
φ φ α φ
β φ
α φ αφ α
βφβ φ φ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− − − + −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ≤ ≤⎪ − Ω⎪≡ ⎨⎪ − − ⎡ − − − ⎤− − ⎣ ⎦⎪ + ≤ ≤⎪ + −⎩
 (35) 
This is a convex quadratic for 0 k k≤ ≤  while it is equal to RG , which is also a convex 
quadratic, for k k k≤ ≤ , and it is shown in figure seven. To see how the region where collusion is 
possible, Gˆ G G≤ ≤ , is divided into regions where there are welfare gains and losses, consider the 
intersections of TG  with Gˆ  and G . It can be shown that ( ) ˆTG G< >  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 2 42 2 12 9 2Sk k cφ φ α φ φ< > ≡ − − − − + . The intersection of TG  and G  occurs where 
0 k k≤ ≤  for Rφ φ<  as in figure 7b and where k k k≤ ≤  for Rφ φ>  as in figure 7b. It can be shown 
that  ( )TG G< >  as ( ) Tk k< > , where ( )( ) ( )2 22 1 3 2Tk cφ α φ≡ − − −  for Rφ φ< , and T Uk k=  as in 
(34) for Rφ φ> . Hence, there are a range of values for the trade cost 0 Sk k≤ ≤  where there are 
always welfare gains from collusion over FDI and a range of values for the trade cost S Tk k k≤ ≤  
where there will be a welfare gain if the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently high. There are welfare gains 
in regions R and T in figure 7a and in region T in figure 7b. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 8: Under Bertrand duopoly, with import tariffs, there will be a welfare gain from 
collusion over FDI if TG G> , which will always be the case for 0 Sk k≤ ≤ , may be the case for 
S Tk k k< < , and will never be the case for Tk k> . Otherwise there will be welfare loss. 
As an illustration of the different welfare effects with transport costs and tariffs, figure eight 
compares welfare in the static game with welfare in the infinitely repeated game for the same 
parameters as in previous figures with 9 10φ = , 1 6δ = , and 30G = . The critical fixed cost of FDI 
to sustain collusion ( )* 2 3G δ =  and the fixed cost 30G =  are shown in figure 7a. The corresponding 
welfare in the static and the infinitely-repeated game are shown in figure 8a when the trade cost is a 
transport cost and in figure 8b when the trade cost is a tariff. In region I, both firms export in the static 
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game and in the infinitely-repeated game so there is no collusive outcome and hence no welfare effect 
from collusion. In region II, both firms undertake FDI in the static game while there is a collusive 
outcome in the infinitely-repeated game where both firms export. This results in a welfare loss with 
transport costs in figure 8a and a welfare gain with tariffs in figure 8b. In region III, both firms 
undertake FDI in the static game and in the infinitely-repeated game so there is no collusive outcome 
and hence no welfare loss from collusion. In region IV, both firms undertake FDI in the static game 
while there is a collusive outcome in the infinitely-repeated game where both firms export. This 
results in a welfare loss with both transport costs in figure 8a and tariffs in figure 8b. Figures 8a and 
8b how a reduction in trade costs may lead to a switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. 
6. Conclusions 
The export versus FDI decisions of firms have been analysed in a two-country model with 
differentiated products under both Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly. In the static game, in 
common with most of the literature, a reduction in trade costs (import tariffs and/or transport costs), 
can only lead firms to switch from undertaking FDI to exporting as it increases the profitability of 
exporting relative to undertaking FDI. It was also shown that the static game is often a prisoners’ 
dilemma where both firms make lower profits when they both undertake FDI than when they both 
export, and this is most likely when the products are close substitutes. This is because undertaking 
FDI increases the intensity of competition in the competitor’s home market. To avoid the prisoners’ 
dilemma, in an infinitely-repeated game, the firms can implicitly collude about their export versus 
FDI decisions by choosing to export rather than to undertake FDI. It was shown that collusion over 
FDI can be sustained by Nash-reversion strategies if the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently high. Then, a 
reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI if the trade cost is 
sufficiently high, as the reduction in trade costs reduces the profitability of collusion over FDI. This 
counterintuitive result contrasts with the results in most of the literature, and may help to explain why 
there has been an increase in FDI in an era of trade liberalisation.5 Also, it was shown that collusion 
                                                 
5 It may also explain the observation of Graham (1978) that US firms undertaking FDI in Europe was 
closely followed by European firms undertaking FDI in the US. If a reduction in trade costs made collusion over 
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over FDI may increase welfare when trade costs are import tariffs and even when trade costs are real 
transport costs. This is most likely when the products are close substitutes, when the trade costs and 
the fixed cost of FDI are high, and when there are import tariffs rather than transport costs. 
The results were qualitatively similar under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, and this 
is surprising given that outputs are strategic substitutes under Cournot duopoly and prices are strategic 
complements under Bertrand duopoly. Since FDI can be viewed as a strategic investment in a fixed 
cost to reduce marginal costs, firms will overinvest in FDI under Cournot duopoly and underinvest 
under Bertrand duopoly. Therefore, it is not surprising that collusion over FDI may result in a welfare 
gain under Cournot duopoly as the firms will overinvest in FDI, but it is rather surprising that the 
same possibility occurs under Bertrand duopoly. Although the results are qualitatively similar, there 
are quantitative differences between the results under Cournot duopoly and under Bertrand duopoly. 
The critical values for the fixed cost of FDI are higher under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand 
duopoly since, as Vives (1985) showed, profits are higher under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand 
duopoly. Also, the negative effect of FDI by a firm on the profits of its competitor are larger under 
Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly since, as Vives (1985) also showed, competition is 
more intense under Bertrand duopoly than under Counot duopoly. 
                                                                                                                                                        
FDI less profitable then a breakdown of collusion would result in both US and European firms would undertake 
FDI in their competitors’ markets. 
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